In my previous post, I discussed objects as monads. As monads, each object or machine is an observer or experiencer of the world. The structure of experience differs from monad to monad. It consists of what a monad can encounter in its world, and how it operates on those inputs. I suspect that monads like rocks have pretty uninteresting structures of experience. Similarly, human experience of light or electro-magnetism is fairly dull compared to how mantis shrimp experience electro-magnetism (we experience 3 primary colors, while they experience 11 or 12. They can see ultraviolet, infrared, and circular polarized light, whereas we cannot). The world looks quite different for mantis shrimp. The mantis shrimp has access to an entirely different world than us.
Likewise, as I suggested in a follow up post, monads like insurance companies are open to the world in a different way than we are. Just like mantis shrimps and humans, insurance companies have their sense-organs and particular openness to their environment. As far as I can tell, insurance companies are capable of sensing four things in their environment: deaths, accidents, natural disasters, and fluctuations in the market. Just like mantis shrimp that sense their environment, in part, through electro-magnetism or wavelengths of light, insurance companies have their medium through which their sense-organs relate to their environment: forms or paperwork. The forms we fill out when filing for coverage are the “light” through which insurance companies sense events in their environment. In this regard, insurance companies are unable to register speech, because like subtle movements that only flies can perceive, speech moves too quickly to be registered by insurance companies. Instead they require the slower medium of the paper or electronic form circulating throughout the apparatus of the bureaucracy.
read on!
So time.
Scott Graham worries that I have an anthropomorphic concept of time:
While Bryant’s point about the whole/part issue is well taken, I must pause at his argument that an object is an “organization or structure that persists across time.” Whose time? I fail to see how this argument amounts to much more than, humans recognize a similarity between two actual occasions and thus by virtue of their temporal endo-structure construe a persistence between the two instantaneous time-slices. And for that matter, would not the perception of similarity itself be information? If an autopoietic system is constantly self-remaking, who is it that is recognizing the persistence/ similarity of the structure/organization?
I hope this isn’t the case, for what I’m angling for is a pluralistic account of time. In this regard, Scott asks exactly the right question when he asks Whose time? Within a pluralistic theory of time, there is not time but times. There is the time of each monad. The time of a rock is different than the time of a human which is different from the time of a fly or an insurance company or a government. Each monad has its own unique structure of time.
Here my inspiration is thoroughly Kantian (though in a reworked sense passing through Jakob von Uexkull’s Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans; Uexkull was one of history’s great monadologists). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes that,
a) Time is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them; for in the first case it would be something that was actual yet without an actual object…
b) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state…
c) Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. (B49 – 50)
For Kant, time is not a feature of the things themselves, but rather is a structure of our subjectivity through which minds such as our own organize our experience of the world. It is a sort of formal structure of what Harman calls “sensual objects” (as opposed to real objects). In this regard, Kant remains agnostic with respect to whether reality itself is structured temporally in this way, leaving open the possibility that it is not and that there are other temporalities that differ from our own.
In my own thoughts about time– and I find it very difficult to talk about time in non-paradoxical ways –I retain Kant’s thesis that time is the way in which monads subjectively order their experience of the world, while pluralizing temporalities. Where Kant restricts his account of time to rational agents such as ourselves, I try to argue that each type of monad has its own structure of temporality. In other words, there is not one transcendental aesthetic, but many transcendental aesthetics.
In Onto-Cartography, I found it useful to talk about these different transcendental aesthetics in terms of “hertz” (Hz’s). There I was trying to talk about time in its simplest, most rudimentary form, prior to getting into more complex structures of temporality possessed by critters such as dolphins, humans, and governments (historicity, futurity, memory, etc). Hertz measure the cycles per second of a periodic phenomena. Thus, for example, humans perceive at a rate of 60 Hz, while houseflies perceive at a rate of 200 Hz, and honeybees perceive at a rate of 300 Hz. These are different temporal structures for different monads. If it’s so hard to swat a pesky housefly, then this is because houseflies can perceive much smaller, faster, more subtle movements than us humans can. As a consequence of this structure of affect, they are able to respond more quickly, deftly escaping our gross and lumbering movements. Every monad has its hertz, or rate at which it encounters the world. An insurance company, for example, might encounter the world at 5 – 10 Hz.
The temporal structure of a monad plays a key role in how it is able to respond to its environment and what it is able to register in its environment. For each monad, there will be events that are either too fast or slow to be registered by that monad. Monads each have their endogenous and exogenous structures of temporality. The exogeneous structure of a monad’s temporality pertains to the rate at which it is able to register events in its environment. Honeybees are able to register much quicker events than us lumbering humans. Us lumbering humans, in our turn, are able to register much quicker events than sloth-like governments. By contrast, the endogeneous dimension of a monad’s temporality refers to the rate at which it’s able to carry out operations within itself. For example, what is the rate at which a cell can complete a chemical process, a brain can make a decision, or a government can enact a new piece of legislation?
Some events will be too slow for a particular monad to register. Take the relationship between the United States government and climate change. At the endogeneous level, US government oscillates at a rate of 2, 4, and 6 years (the various election cycles). This entails that it will be relatively blind to slow moving catastrophes like climate change. These election cycles entail that governments such as our own will favor short term planning, pertaining to the issues of the day, and will find it very difficult to respond to long term issues and engage in long term planning. For environmental activists, this entails that a central political question is how to respond to the temporal limitations of monads like governments.
In his post, Scott writes,
I’m a theoretical pragmatist (both in the philosophical and colloquial sense of the term, but here I mean the colloquial). For me the utility of a theory is in many ways based on whether or not it offers a better/ more compelling account of the objects of study. Within new materialism, there are many options available. OOO is one of the primary among post-ANT/associology. However, I am a bit concerned regarding the comparative utility of OOO as long as it fails to overcome the problem of time as information.
I share Scott’s commitment to theoretical pragmatism. I think that concepts that make no difference are useless. Good concepts are ones that generate new questions, new areas of inquiry, and new forms of engagement. I think the account of time I am crudely sketching here and elsewhere does this in a variety of different ways:
First, it allows us to discern new forms of power. On the one hand, because this account of time is pluralistic, positing a variety of different times rather than just one time that contains all entities, we can now raise questions about what happens when one monad is captured in the temporal field of another monad. Student loan and credit card debt, for example, are forms of temporal capture by corporations, banks, and governments. A person’s life becomes trapped and striated by this temporal field and they become indentured servants. Everything becomes structured around that 20+ years of indenture.
On the other hand, it allows us to discern chrono-political strategies of control and domination. Those of us working in the tradition of cultural Marxism and Foucault, are accustomed to examining how people are duped into willing their own oppression by ideology and investigating how institutions and technologies like the panopticon exercise control, but there isn’t nearly as much attention to how the structuration of time itself is a strategy of domination. Marx– who was not a cultural Marxist –recognized this in his reflections on the working day. Monads such as ourselves only have so much carrying capacity with respect to energy and influxes of information. Fatigue is a real political issue and a genuine strategy of domination. If I am doing one thing, I can’t do another thing. If I am attending to this or that bit of information, I am not attending to other bits of information. If my working day is so saturated by labor that all my calories are eaten up, I’m left without energy for revolt. One contributor to people tolerating their own oppressive conditions is to be found simply in structurations of time and energy, rather than mistaken ideological beliefs. Recognizing this opens the possibility of new political strategies for freeing up time.
Finally, third, recognizing that each monad can only exogeneously encounter its environment at particular rates, allows us to devise strategies for overcoming these forms of structural and temporal blindness; these forms of a priori blindness. It seems to me that pragmatically these considerations are all things of great use and value.
May 5, 2013 at 6:11 pm
” I suspect that monads like rocks have pretty uninteresting structures of experience.” Doesn’t time work into this? Rocks react over millions, and hundreds of millions of years. Rocks lead pretty dynamic lives over time.
May 6, 2013 at 1:54 am
Levi, did you mean to write that “humans perceive at a rate of 60 Hz”? That’s only one frequency in the range of what we can hear.
May 6, 2013 at 2:42 am
Dave, yes. The link I provide cites that for our visual perception. Hertz don’t just measure sound.
May 6, 2013 at 10:42 am
[…] has a great post up, coming of the back of a series, on the nature of object/machines as experentialities, or monads. […]
May 6, 2013 at 2:51 pm
[…] always smart blog Attempts at Living has a nice post up responding to my last post. I particularly liked this […]
May 6, 2013 at 4:40 pm
I take your general point: different monads operate at different time scales. I think it’s misleading, though, to ascribe “a” frequency (Hz) to humans on the basis of flicker fusion, since we experience some events at frequencies lower — and higher — than 60 Hz. And I assume you’re not speaking of flicker fusion when you refer to the frequency of an insurance company. Or… ? (With AI going the way it is, who knows!)
May 6, 2013 at 5:03 pm
Why is it misleading? Light is a wave and different critters only have access to those waves within certain frequencies. Such observations remind us that things like perception are material and physical processes. Corporations have their rates at which the can perceive as well.
May 6, 2013 at 5:31 pm
That said, the important point is that any interface with environments (of which communication is a variant) takes time (insofar as media, including light and sound, can only move at certain rates), and that every monad is limited in terms of what durations it is and is not open to depending on the speed and slownesses of these entities. If you have other terminology suggestions that overcome our tendency to forget this, I’d be very grateful.
May 6, 2013 at 6:25 pm
I like the idea of using cycles per second (Hz) as a measure. Given the complex array of frequencies that can be perceived (by all objects), I think it might work to refer to “frequency profiles.” That way, you wouldn’t be married to a specific piece of scientific data from the vast literature available. When it comes to corporations, Hz would also work, but again, as a profile, since corporations operate according to different frequencies based on the materials at their means. For example, while it’s certainly true that a corporation can’t respond quickly to some events, some corporations can outpace humans by a great deal for other events. I’m thinking of the speed of the computer trading on the stock market and the general trend of computers outstripping humans in the frequencies at which they can perceive events.
Hope this helps. Maybe there is a term besides “frequency profiles” that hasn’t occurred to me. And in any event, I do agree emphatically with your overall point.
May 7, 2013 at 5:39 pm
“Take the relationship between the United States government and climate change. At the endogeneous level, US government oscillates at a rate of 2, 4, and 6 years (the various election cycles). This entails that it will be relatively blind to slow moving catastrophes like climate change. These election cycles entail that governments such as our own will favor short term planning, pertaining to the issues of the day, and will find it very difficult to respond to long term issues and engage in long term planning. For environmental activists, this entails that a central political question is how to respond to the temporal limitations of monads like governments.”
And yet the U.S. government is perfectly capable of visionary long term planning, point in fact the Pentagon’s Fifty Year plan spanning multiple presidencies and congresses. And has anyone else noticed the prevalence of solar and wind farms at forts and other military compounds? Despite Obama refusing to replace Jimmy Carter’s solar panels (taken down by Reagan) in the White House, our leaders, it seems, are happy to Go Green as long as it facilitates war and energy-sector profiteering; the insanity appears total.
It’s why I so admired your recent post discussing psychosis referencing Artaud and Schreber and their distinctive psychoses. I saw there a glimmer of hope, political hope. One way or another we all have to be in the psychosis-curing business, but scaled-up to the level of institutions.
I really think you continue to be on the right track, Levi. And I’m grateful you’ve found the stamina to refresh your modes and to keep going strong.